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Mental health, community
care and human rights in
Europe: Still an incomplete
picture?1
Jill Stavert2
‘One of the key messages to governments is that mental asylums, where they still exist, must be closed
down and replaced with well-organized community-based care and psychiatric beds in general hospitals.
The days of locking up people with mental or behavioural disorders in grim prison-like psychiatric
institutions must end.’
World Health Organisation, 
World Health Report 2001: Mental Health – New Understanding, New Hope, p4. 
1. Introduction
a. The recognition of human rights of those suffering from mental illness 
According to the European Union Green Paper Improving the mental health of the population: Towards a
strategy on mental health for the European Union, more than 27% adult Europeans are likely to suffer from
at least one form of mental illness during any one year and by 2020 depression is expected to be the
highest ranking cause of disease in the developed world3. A recent article which reported the results of a
global study in The Lancet also comments that “depression impairs health state to a substantially greater
degree than other diseases”4.
1 The author would like to thank Douglas Maule (Centre
for Law, Napier University) for his very helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this article. Any errors or omissions
are, however, those of the author.  
2 Lecturer, Centre for Law, Napier University, Edinburgh.
3 European Union, Improving the mental health of the
population: Towards a strategy on mental health for the
European Union, Brussels COM (2005) 484, p4,
referring to H.U. Wittchen and F. Jacobi (2005), ‘Size and
burden of mental disorders in Europe: A critical review
and appraisal of 27 studies’, 15(4) European
Neuropsychopharmacology 357; World Health
Organisation (WHO), World Health Report 2001:
Mental Health – New Understanding, New Hope ,
www.who.int/whr/2001 (accessed 8 September 2007).
4 S. Moussavi et al (2007), ‘Depression, chronic diseases,
and decrements in health: results from the World Health
Surveys’, 370 The Lancet 85, www.thelancet.com
(accessed 8 September 2007).
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Mental health issues are increasingly finding their way onto national, European and international
agendas. Moreover, the term ‘mental health’, though sometimes difficult to define with precision, has
been taken to include not only mental ill health but also the maintenance of good mental health in
general5. 
There has also been a growing recognition that persons who suffer from mental ill-health must be
protected from discrimination and abuse. The World Health Organization and the European Union have
both, for example, emphasised the importance of protecting the rights of those suffering from mental ill-
health and of ensuring and maintaining social inclusion for this vulnerable group of persons. In a welcome
development, the United Nations finally adopted its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities6 in December 2006 although it is not yet in force. Amongst
other things, this treaty specifically refers to those suffering from mental or intellectual impairment7. 
It has also gradually become accepted that those suffering from mental illness possess rights which must
be respected. Since 1979, the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, has developed a body of
case law affirming that certain European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rights are relevant to
mental health. The emphasis has thus been on civil rights that mainly relate to the detention and
treatment of the mentally ill, such as the rights to personal liberty; respect for private and family life;
procedural justice; and cruel and the prevention of inhuman treatment8. Latterly, this recognition at
European level has found expression at national level in that domestic legislation and case law are starting
to reflect the relevant provisions of the ECHR. Clearly, in the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 has been
influential in this respect9 and relevant ECHR provisions are reflected, to some extent, in the provisions
of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 and the Mental Health Act 2007, and they
have created some judicial dilemmas, particularly in the realm of public safety and involuntary
treatment10.
b. De-institutionalisation and the increasing importance of socio-economic rights 
Given the historical emphasis on civil and political rights in Western Europe, and the fact that
traditionally the care and treatment of those with mental illness took place mainly in an institutional
setting11, it is unsurprising that civil rights associated with the detention and conditions of treatment of
the mentally ill were the first to be recognised by the European Court of Human Rights and also within
5 The WHO, for example, defines mental health as: 
“a state of well-being in which the individual realises his or
her abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can
work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a
contribution to his or her community”
(WHO, Strengthening Mental Health Promotion, Geneva
2001 (Fact Sheet no.220)).
6 Doc. A/61/611, 6 December 2006.
7 Article 1. See also Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental
Health Care (1991).
8 For example, on Article 5 ECHR see Winterwerp v
Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 (definition of ‘unsound
mind’ and detention), Aerts v Belgium (1998) 29 EHRR
50 (no detention of mental patients in prison), Johnson v
UK (1999) 27 EHRR 440 and Kolanis v UK (2006) 42
EHRR 12 (timely release from psychiatric institution) and
E v Norway (1994) 17 EHRR 30 (review of detention) .
See also Bensaid v UK (2001) 333 EHRR 10 (mental
health is a vital aspect of family life), Keenan v United
Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38(segregation and extension
of prison term), Peers v Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 51
(prison conditions)), H L v United Kingdom (2004) 40
EHRR 761 and Storck v Germany [2005] ECHR 406
(involving the interplay of Articles 5, 8 and 3 ECHR).
9 See also J. Stavert (2007), ‘From avoidance to acceptance:
Mental health and the role of human rights in Europe’,
356 Scolag Legal Journal 119.
10 For example, A v Scottish Ministers 2001 SC 1
(concerning the issue of public safety and individual rights
and Articles 2 and 5 ECHR); R (on the application of
Wilkinson) v RMO, Broadmoor Hospital Authority
[2001] EWCA Civ. 1545 (involuntary treatment and
Article 3) and R (on the application of N) v M [2003] 1
WLR 562 (involuntary treatment and Article 3 ECHR).
11 C. Unsworth (1993), ‘Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s
“Golden Age”‘, 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 479.  
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the UK. That being said, whilst the development of human rights associated with mental health has
naturally been very welcome, it nevertheless has not yet appeared to go far enough. An example of this
can be seen in the progressive move away from institutionalisation to care in the community. Currently,
predominant ‘Western’ clinical opinion holds that, excepting where it is otherwise necessary to protect
the individual or public, persons suffering from mental ill health and disability should be treated and
supported in the community12. 
This shift away from a mainly institutional approach to an emphasis on ‘care in the community’, together
with the recognition that people suffering from mental health problems form a vulnerable group worthy
of protection under the law, has occurred over the last century. In the UK, this gradual approach can be
discerned from the Mental Treatment Act 1930 to the Percy Commission Report in 195713, through the
Mental Health Act 1959 and Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960, the Mental Health Act 1983 and the
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 to, finally, the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003
and the Mental Health Act 2007.
It is generally recognised, in most Western European states at least, that for vulnerable members of society
to be fully protected and enabled to seek and obtain those goods, services and support that they need and
want, there must be clearly stated and defined rights which are underpinned and enforced by law.
Recognised and enforceable human rights standards may stem from international and regional treaties,
but these, in turn, must be incorporated or transposed within states through legislation and by receptive
courts14.  
As the move away from institutionalisation has progressed, there has emerged an appreciation of those
civil, social and economic rights necessary to ensure adequate treatment and support outside the confines
of institutions, and of the need to respect and protect such rights15. Indeed, we are nowadays arguably
moving beyond the development of civil rights of judicial process towards a conception of entitlement to
the least restrictive, but adequate, manner of treatment16. 
It is accordingly essential that socio-economic rights are recognised and enforced if care in the
community and social inclusion17 are to be effective and more than merely aspirational18. The purpose of
this article is therefore to reflect on this issue in the light of direction from Europe.
12 WHO (2007), Community mental health services will
lessen social exclusion, says WHO, News, 1 June 2007;
World Health; WHO, World Health Report 2001, op cit.
13 Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency. 1954–1957.
Chairperson: Lord Percy. Cmnd 169. HMSO, May 1957.
14 WHO (2005), Mental Health: Human rights and
legislation, p6.
15 L. Gostin (2001), ‘Beyond moral claims – A human
rights approach to mental health’, Special section: Keeping
human rights in the bioethics agenda, 10(3) Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 264.
16 L. Gostin (1983), ‘Perspectives on Mental Health
Reforms’, 10 Journal of Law and Society 47. Gostin was
writing about the Mental Health Act 1983 in England
and Wales; P. Fennel (1999), ‘The Third Way in Mental
Health Policy: Negative Rights, Positive Rights, and the
Convention’, 26 Journal of Law and Society 103, p105. 
17 By “social inclusion” the author means access to those
goods and services which are necessary for individuals 
to fully and effectively participate in society or the
communities in which they live. Note also that ‘social
inclusion’ and ‘care in the community’, whilst sharing a
number of common attributes, are not the same.
18 Note also that, in some cases, there should be rights of
access to and receipt of appropriate services in order to
support those caring and supporting others with mental
illness (and, conversely, rights for those suffering from
mental illness to protect them from abusive carers and
relatives). See, for example, J. Atkinson (2006), Private
and Public Protection: Civil Mental Health Legislation,
Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, pp59–68. 
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2. Rights for inclusion in the community: Beyond civil rights
When ascertaining precisely which rights are required to enable a person with mental illness to
successfully participate in society outside institutions it is necessary to first separate two aspects of
community care. 
On the one hand, there is a need to consider those situations where certain restrictions and requirements
must exist in order to ensure that the individual can function within the community whilst, at the same
time, protecting other members of society19. Here, although all categories of rights are applicable, civil
rights (for example, relating to liberty, the right to life20 and protection from cruel and inhuman
treatment) tend to take on greater prominence. Reciprocity is important, in that if an element of
compulsion exists in community care and treatment, then there should be commensurate obligations on
public authorities to provide appropriate services21. 
On the other hand, whilst civil rights (for example, rights relating to procedural fairness and non-
discrimination in terms of accessing and receiving services and guardianship) are of course relevant, so
are those socio-economic rights which enable individuals to seek, access and receive those goods,
services, and support which enable them to function to the best of their ability in the communities in
which they live. This includes rights to health services (for both mental and physical health), benefits and
rehabilitation services, housing and access to education and employment. Non-discrimination and
equality are also vital components in the provision of such assistance. 
As already stated, for such rights to be effectively implemented, there needs to be a relevant international
and/or regional human rights framework supported by appropriate legislation and recognition by domestic
courts. It is therefore necessary to first consider which international and regional socio-economic rights
standards exist that are relevant to mental health care in Europe.
3. International and European frameworks for mental health and related 
socio-economic rights 
a. International instruments 
At international level, various documents have aligned socio-economic rights with mental health, either
expressly or by implication. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
does not expressly refer to persons with mental illness, or indeed with any form of disability, but the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights makes it clear that such persons are included under
the Covenant22. It has stated that the obligation of states parties to promote progressive realisation of full
participation and equality in society requires ‘positive action’23. The Committee further states that ‘this
almost invariably means that additional resources will need to be made available for this purpose and that
19 However, it is arguable that the public safety risk, though
tragic when supervisory systems provide to be ineffective,
may be over-exaggerated, particularly by the media.
Indeed, evidence suggests that severe mental illness of itself
does not necessarily equate with greater criminal activity
and that factors such as being in receipt of state benefits
and having no fixed accommodation may be more
influential. See C.T. Sheldon et al (2006), ‘Social
disadvantage, mental illness and predictors of legal
involvement’, 29 International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 249, p253. This article presents data collected
in a study conducted in Ontario, Canada. See also WHO,
World Health Report 2001, op cit, p4.
20 This includes members of the public and those who are
mentally ill.
21 Atkinson, op cit, pp76–78.
22 Persons with disabilities :General Comment 5. 09/12/94
Doc. E/1995/22, para 3 (adopting the Standard Rules 
on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with
Disabilities, Annexed to General Assembly resolution
48/96 of 20 December 1993 (Introduction, para. 17)).
23 General Comment 5, ibid at para 9.
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a wide range of specially tailored measures will be required’. Rights which are specifically relevant to
mental health are identified as the right to work, to social security, to protection of the family and of
mothers and children, to an adequate standard of living (including accommodation), to physical and
mental health (including the right to rehabilitation services), to education, and to participate in cultural
life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress24. Equality and non-discrimination are also important.
Sadly, however, the Committee has also noted that states parties’ promotion of such rights has not always
been encouraging25. 
Similarly, the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the
Improvement of Mental Health Care26, refers to the right to be treated in the community27 and in the least
restrictive environment28. Likewise, Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities makes it clear that the term ‘disability’ includes mental illness
and, amongst other rights, Article 19 contains specific provisions relating to integration into society for
those with mental illness. This includes the opportunity to choose how and where to live29 and access to
a range of services to assist and support in such integration30. 
Against this international background, European regional instruments are more directly reflected at
municipal level.  
b. European instruments
The Council of Europe’s original 1961 and revised 1996 versions of the European Social Charter (ESC)
contain socio-economic rights which are relevant and applicable to integration into society of those with
mental illness. Provisions of the ECHR, such as Article 6 in terms of procedural matters relating to the
assessment and provision of goods and services, may also have relevance here. However, being an
instrument of civil and political rights, the ECHR is better at protecting individuals from unnecessary or
uninvited treatment and detention than at ensuring they receive that which is essential for them to
effectively integrate into society31. For example, it protects individuals from unwarranted and excessive
detention and treatment under Articles 5, 3 and 8, and ensures fair procedures when matters are
adjudicated. However, these negative rights are insufficient by themselves if those suffering from mental
ill health are to be fully and effectively integrated into the communities in which they live and work and
cared for and supported there. The ESC therefore has a potentially important supplementary role.  
In terms of social integration, Article 15 ESC is the most prominent,32 although, given the Charter’s
provisions on non-discrimination and equality, its other provisions are clearly applicable. The objective
of Article 15 of the Revised ESC is that persons with disabilities, including those with mental illness, are
able to function to the best of their ability within their communities and therefore includes the right to
“independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community”33. This takes forward
the right contained in the original 1961 version of the Charter which provided for “the effective exercise
24 ICESCR Articles 6–8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15
respectively. See General Comment ibid, Parts III and IV.
25 General Comment 5, op cit at para 10.





30 Article 19(b) and (c). 
31 B. Hale (2007), ‘Justice and equality in mental health
law: The European experience’, 30 International Journal
of Law and Psychiatry 18.
32 Council of Europe, Rights of people with disabilities: Fact
sheet on Article 15 of the Revised European Charter.
33 Article 15 Revised European Social Charter 1996. 
See also European Committee of Social Rights (2003),
Statement of Interpretation on Article 15, Conclusions,
p10, and European Committee of Social  Rights (2006),
Digest of the Case Law, December, p114. 
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of the right of the physically or mentally disabled to vocational training, rehabilitation and resettlement”
to be achieved through the provision of public and private training facilities and employment34. 
Article 15 of the Revised Charter35 refers to “the effective exercise of the right to independence, social
integration and participation in the life of the community” and stipulates that this includes the provision
of mainstream or, where this is not possible, specialised “guidance, education and vocational training”36.
It also states37 that this includes the promotion of employment in the ordinary workplace where this is
possible. In regard to other measures to promote access to employment, states are afforded a margin of
appreciation, but this will not prevent the Committee from considering whether or not such measures
effectively comply with the provision38. Article 15(3) also places an obligation on States to promote “full
social integration and participation in the life of the community” using measures “to overcome barriers to
communication and mobility and enabling access to transport, housing, cultural activities and leisure”.
This obligation includes providing effective remedies for those who have been unlawfully treated39.
Moreover, in relation to housing, the European Committee of Social Rights has stated40 that “The needs
of persons with disabilities must be taken into account in housing policies;”41.
However, despite these provisions, in terms of direction and effectiveness, the European system has its
imperfections. 
4. Human rights and community care: An intricate web?
a. Council of Europe direction
The socio-economic rights referred to in the aforementioned international and European instruments
have to be realised and implemented at national level. The problem is that, unfortunately, state
promotion of these rights, despite the realisation in recent years that these should be given equal weight
to civil and political rights42, has tended to lag behind that of civil and political rights. In terms of
leadership and direction, the Council of Europe has also been slower in pursuing this category of rights,
particularly in relation to persons with disabilities. The social right to independence, social integration
and participation in community life for those with disabilities set out in Article 15 of the ESC are not
‘core’ rights under the Charter, notwithstanding the fact that mental health and rights has been gathering
momentum.
34 This includes specialised placing services, facilities for
sheltered employment and measures to encourage
employers to employ disabled persons. 
35 See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly,
Recommendation 1185 (1992) on rehabilitation society
policies for the disabled which also notes the need for those
suffering from a disability (including mental illness) to be
fully integrated into society and to have greater ownership
in regard to the process of such integration.
36 Article 15(1). See European Committee of Social Rights
(2006), Digest, ibid and Autism Europe v France,
Complaint No. 13/2002, Decision on the merits of 4
November 2003, para 48. “...The underlying vision of
Article 15 is one of equal citizenship for persons with
disabilities and, fittingly, the primary rights are those of
“independence, social integration and participation in the
life of the community”. Securing a right to education for
children and others with disabilities plays an obviously
important role in advancing these citizenship rights. This
explains why education is now specifically mentioned in
the revised Article 15 and why such an emphasis is placed
on achieving that education “in the framework of general
schemes, wherever possible”. It should be noted that
Article 15 applies to all persons with disabilities regardless
of the nature and origin of their disability and irrespective
of their age. It thus clearly covers both children and adults
with autism. See also European Committee of Social
Rights (2005), Conclusions, p96 (regarding Cyprus).
37 Article 15(2).
38 European Committee of Social Rights (2006), op cit,
p115; European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions
XVII- 2, Belgium, p152.




42 See, for example, the UN Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993.
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To date, apart from the European Committee of Social Rights commenting once on Article 15
compliance under the reporting system43, there only appear to have been two complaints brought under
the European Charter which specifically relate to mental disability44. There are none relating specifically
to mental illness. That being said, the Committee appears to adopt a strict approach to the interpretation
of the Charter when presented with alleged violations. The complaint of IAAE v. France related to
insufficient educational provision, in both mainstream and specialist institutions and services, for children
and adults with autism. IAAE alleged that, whilst French law was prima facie in compliance with Articles
15(1), 17(1) (The right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection) and
E(non-discrimination) of the Revised Charter, in terms of implementation it did not comply. It also noted
that the allocation of insufficient resources was an important factor. The Committee decided that all
three articles had been violated, and, whilst it made no specific comment on the adequacy of resource
allocation, it can be reasonably inferred that the Committee did not consider it to be sufficient in this
particular case. States may even try to use their own non-acceptance of Article 15 to avoid responsibility
under the ESC. For example, in Mental Disability Advocacy Center v Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government
argued that, as it did not accept Article 15(1), a complaint to the Committee concerning the lack of
education provided for children living in homes for the mentally disabled was inadmissable, on the
grounds that, although the complaint was made under Articles 17 and E of the Revised Charter, it should
have correctly been made under Article 15(1)45. Encouragingly, however, it would seem that the
Committee gave short shrift to this argument46. It considered that the case was admissible on the basis
that, although the rights of persons with disabilities are guaranteed under Article 15(1), this does not
exclude relevant issues being raised elsewhere under the Revised Charter. Accordingly, as this case was
also about education, it could legitimately be considered under Article 17(2) of the Revised Charter. 
b. Resourcing 
Even where a particular country’s laws and constitutional structure ostensibly provide the means to seek
respect for and protection of the rights of those with mental disabilities, the implementation of these is
often an entirely different matter47. Council of Europe standards and national laws can thus only go so
far and are inevitably subject to political influences and resources. Implementation of economic and
social rights requires that positive steps be taken by the state, generally progressively and often including
the allocation of substantial amounts of resources. Yet, insufficient funding is allocated to mental health
expenditure48. Only those states that possess, or are prepared to allocate, the resources and relevant
information will ensure that the implementation of these standards is other than illusory49. According to
the EU Green Paper, the UK spends in the region of 12% of its total health expenditure on mental health
and Luxembourg slightly under 14%, Slovakia only 2% and the Czech Republic 3%, and France 5%50. 
43 European Committee of Social Rights (2003), European
Social Charter: Conclusions XVII-2, vols 1 and 2 and
European Committee of Social Rights, European Social
Charter (Revised) Conclusions 2003, vols 1 and 2.
44 International Association Autism-Europe (IAAE) v.
France Complaint No.13/2002, Decision on the Merits, 7
November 2003 (violation of Articles 15(1), 17(1) and E
of the Revised Charter) and Mental Disability Advocacy
Center v Bulgaria Complaint No. 41/2007, Decision on
Admissibility, 26 June 2007 (alleged violations of Article
17(2) and E of the Revised Charter). 
45 At para 8.
46 A paras 9–11.
47 O. Lewis (2002), “Mental disability law in central and
Eastern Europe: paper, practice, promise”, 8 Journal of
Mental Health Law, 283. 
48 D. McDaid et al (2005), “Mental Health III: Funding
mental health in Europe”, Policy Brief, WHO European
Centre for Health Policy, Brussels.    
49 Kwame Akuffo (2004), ‘The involuntary detention of
persons with mental disorder in England and Wales – A
human rights critique’, 27 International Journal of Law
and Psychiatry 109, p131. 
50 European Union (2005), Improving the mental health of
the population: Towards a strategy on mental health for
the European Union, Brussels COM 484, p21.
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Indeed, the assessment of entitlement to goods and services which support integration in the community,
may require those suffering from mental ill-health to compete with other vulnerable groups of persons.
Moreover, allocation of these resources is often subject to a number of different, and occasionally
contradictory, policies and laws. This is particularly evident in, but not confined to, the case of
accommodation. In Scotland, a recent decision of the Outer House of the Court of Session, whilst not
specifically referring to social rights, appears to highlight some of the difficulties faced in relation to
establishing a priority need for housing for those suffering from mental illness and the allocation of
resources. In this case, Morgan v Stirling Council51, it was held that the petitioner, who suffered from
“depression and nervous disability”, did not fulfil the criteria to establish a priority need under
s.25(1)(c)52 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 for local authority accommodation. The sub-section
states that for a priority need to be established one must show that one is vulnerable as a result of inter
alia mental illness. Adopting the comparative assessment test in Wilson v Nithsdale District Council53 and
judgments in the English cases R v London Borough of Camden ex p Pereira54 and Griffin v Westminster
Council55, the court stated56 that, in order to establish that the petitioner is vulnerable under this sub-
section, all the circumstances must be taken into account and “it must appear that her ability to fend for
herself whilst homeless is more likely to result in injury or detriment to her than would be the case with
an ordinary homeless person.”57 In this case, it was considered that the local authority had applied this
comparative test and had acted reasonably in accordance with the Wednesbury test in determining that
a priority need did not exist. This was despite the fact that the petitioner was homeless, her boyfriend’s
parents no longer had room to accommodate her, and her Community Alcohol and Drugs Service
community charge nurse expressed concern that her homeless state might have a detrimental effect on
her stability and progress in recovery from drug abuse. The court also made it clear that the local
authority, and not the court, is best placed to make decisions on priorities, as the local authority possesses
the most appropriate knowledge of housing and applicants within its area58. 
Cases such as this raise the issue of what is and what is not acceptable in terms of ‘progressive realisation’
of socio-economic rights. They also raise the thorny issue of the extent to which the courts should
effectively adjudicate on the allocation of resources, given that this potentially strays onto the territory of
the other institutions of government. It is certainly the case that the courts in some Eastern European
countries, such as Hungary, may, somewhat ironically, seek to maintain the status quo and prevent the
erosion of social rights which existed during the Communist era in the face of the currently more market-
driven policies59. They are, in other words, effectively enforcing social rights negatively. However, the
generally positive nature of social and economic rights nevertheless calls into question fundamental
constitutional principles such as judicial independence and its potential compromise. This can present
difficulties unless the view is adopted that courts play an integral, but not dominant or directive, role in
the whole process of recognition and implementation of socio-economic rights60.
51 2006 SLT 962.
52 ‘The following have a priority need for
accommodation...(c) a person who is vulnerable as a
result of ...(ii) mental illness;’ 
53 1992 SLT 1131.
54 (1999) 31 HLR 317.
55 [2004] EWCA Civ 108.
56 Lord Glennie at 963.
57 Lord Glennie at 963.
58 Lord Glennie at 965.
59 A. Sajó (2006), ‘Social Rights as Middle-Class
Entitlements in Hungary:The Role of the Constitutional
Court’, in R. Gargarella et al (eds), Courts and Social
Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional
Voice for the Poor?, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp83–105.
60 R. Gargarella (2006), ‘Theories of democracy, the
Judiciary and Social Rights’, in R. Gargarella et al, ibid,
pp13–34. 
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Difficulties may also occur where care and treatment in the community contain elements of compulsion.
Questions arise here as to the choices that an individual can and should be able to make61. The role of
law here may in fact militate against the realisation of human rights. Indeed, where the law provides for
compulsory community care it can actually be disempowering to those suffering from mental illness, in
that it extends the control of medical practitioners and restricts patient choice62.
c. Fragmented and disjointed laws
Positive rights that might be implied from ECHR principles are not usually interpreted to imply absolute
obligations to provide services. For example, although Article 5(4) ECHR provides for the release of
patients from detention often into community care,63 this does not necessarily automatically equate with
an absolute obligation being placed on public authorities to provide appropriate support for those persons
released into the community. In the UK, for instance, in R(K) v Camden and Islington64 the Court of
Appeal held that if the necessary care65 cannot be found in the community then a breach of Article 5
does not occur if the patient remains in detention. It considered that health authorities are only obliged
to make reasonable efforts to comply with the conditions of the discharge order and are not under an
absolute duty in this respect66.
The split between rights to care and duties of care provision may be exacerbated by fragmented or
inadequate laws relating to service provision. In Hungary67, for example, programmes providing
community-based care are generally inadequate and inconsistent across the country68. Likewise, in
England there is a confusing array of enactments dealing with community care services starting with the
National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 and also including Part III National Assistance Act
1948, s45 Health Services and Public Health Act 1968, s21 and Sch8 National Health Service Act 1977 and
s117 Mental Health Act 198369. In Scotland, the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 has been much amended
over time to bolster community care provision70. However, evaluation is difficult given the lack of
availability of the current version of the 1968 Act!71 Moreover, ss.25, 26 and 27 of the Mental Health
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, providing for services for care and support, the promotion of
well-being and social development and travel assistance, are important  but do not state how long these
services will be provided for persons suffering from mental illness. Certainly, it is implicit that these 
61 Hale, op cit.
62 C. Unsworth (1993), ‘Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s
“Golden Age”‘, 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 479.
In addition, the effectiveness of community treatment
orders has also not yet been conclusively determined. See J.
Dawson et al (2003), ‘Ambivalence about Community
Treatment Orders’, 26 International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry, 243, which notes this and advocates that more
extensive research is undertaken in this area.
63 Winterwerp v Netherlands, op cit. See also Johnson v
UK(1999) 27 EHRR 440 and Kolanis v UK (2006) 
42 EHRR 12. 
64 [2002] QB 198. See also R (H) v Secretary of State for
Home Department [2004] 2 AC  253 (Article 5 ECHR
is not violated if  a person of ‘unsound mind’ is detained
but may be better cared for in a different way).
65 The issue in this case involved a condition requiring
medical supervision of a conditionally discharged patient in
the community. However, a doctor who would agree to
supervise the patient in the community could not be
identified.  
66 pp228–229.
67 Which ratified the original ESC and has signed but not yet
ratified the Revised Charter.
68 Human Rights and Mental Health: Hungary, op cit,
pp58–64.
69 See P. Bartlett and P. Sandland (2007), Mental Health
Law: Policy and Practice, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press,
pp435–496.
70 By the National Health Service and Community Care Act
1990, Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996,
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services are only to be provided for those persons who are subject to compulsion under the Act72 and may
therefore lead to a lack of uniformity in service provision73.    
d. Cultural and political interpretations
Underlying implementation of socio-economic rights – in fact, of human rights in general – is the issue
of the impact which different cultural and political attitudes and ideologies have on the recognition and
implementation of human rights, including socio-economic rights. This is compounded where the human
rights of those with mental ill health are concerned. The extent to which those suffering from mental ill
health are indeed entitled to “rights” and the manner in which “mental health” and “mental illness” is
interpreted is very pertinent. In terms of different political attitudes, the Russian State74 has in the past
and is still prepared to detain its opponents in psychiatric hospitals75. Larisa Arap76 was involuntarily
detained and treated only this year after her criticisms of state psychiatric provision. Although she was
eventually released, her initial detention was without judicial sanction and later, alarmingly, with it.
In terms of cultural attitudes, we might consider Hungarian out-patient programmes for the mentally ill,
which lack provision for supported accommodation and employment, psychological rehabilitation and
advocacy services77. A lack of funding is a major contributor to this78, but cultural interpretations of
mental health are also influential. Although the situation is slowly changing, mental illness tends to be
stigmatised and with symptoms, rather than the actual condition, being treated by the medical profession.
Moreover, the residue of stigmatisation of certain social problems, such as unemployment, from the
communist era remains, and may be experienced by the sufferers as symptoms which equate to mental
illness79. Both sufferers and community have also generally considered in-patient care as being the only
adequate form of treatment for mental illness80.
Nor is it certain that the European Union’s Charter on Fundamental Rights,81 if and when it becomes
legally binding, will bring about improved human rights protection. It has all the correct ingredients,
including civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, and it refers to responsibilities as well as
rights. Whether this will appeal to the wide spectrum of political and cultural ideologies across Europe
remains to be seen. Socio-economic considerations may have traditionally been of greater concern to
non-Western European states82. It would, however, be unwise to assume that all new Member States share
72 Atkinson, op cit, p77. 
73 Ibid, p77.
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ratified neither and has ratified the ECHR.
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‘’Psychiatric ‘care’ still a political weapon in Russia?’,
Media Release, 21 August 2007. 
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The Russian Human Rights Ombudsman ultimately
confirmed that her detention had been illegal and she was
released after 47 days. There was considerable support
amongst human rights commentators for the view that this
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Disability Advocacy Center, ‘Psychiatric ‘care’ still a
political weapon in Russia?’ ibid.
77 Mental Disability Rights International (1997), Human
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common political, social and cultural traditions83. It must also not be forgotten that Western European
states have historically tended to place greater emphasis on civil and political rights and their
implementation. Moreover, whether accession to the EU will bring about more widespread human rights
observance in general within Member States is debateable, even though the EU proclaims respect for the
rule of law, democracy and human rights. Despite the rulings in Carpenter, Schmidberger and Omega
Spielhallen84, the importance which the European Court of Justice will ultimately ascribe to fundamental
rights is at present not yet completely clear85. Some pessimism certainly exists on the issue of whether
accession to the EU will result in better human rights respect and protection for those persons with
mental disabilities in central and eastern European countries given the EU’s predominantly economic
focus86. That being said, the fact that there is ostensibly greater reciprocity in terms of the benefits that
membership of the EU may bring might perhaps encourage greater and more effective implementation. 
6. Conclusion
Over the last two decades we have come some way in Europe towards recognising that those suffering
from mental illness require enforceable rights so that they are not subjected to abuse and neglect. These
rights are, however, mainly civil rights which are applicable to the patient-institution relationship. If care
takes place outside institutions, a far greater emphasis on socio-economic rights is required. This will
enable those with mental illness to access and receive those services and that support which is necessary
for them to function as effectively as possible within the communities in which they live. Yet, despite
international and European standards87 to this effect, the actual realisation of these at national level is
slow88. Undoubtedly the lack of imperative is largely owing to the very nature of socio-economic rights
and the positive obligations they place on states.
Adequate rights and the law do not alone, of course, provide the answer to full and effective care in the
community. There is always a balance to be struck between the desire to provide community care and
availability of resources, the rights of the person suffering from mental ill health and public safety. 
Socio-economic rights are, however, incontrovertibly an important component in the achievement of the
‘well-organized community-based care’ envisaged by the WHO89, the community care provisions in the
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities90 and
‘independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community’ referred to in the
Revised ESC91. Their recognition and implementation, together with adequate resourcing and proper
coordination between relevant care givers, will reduce the risk that individuals will ultimately not benefit
from care in the community, and possibly become subject to compulsory admission to psychiatric units or
the criminal justice system92. 
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